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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Post-Conviction Relief Should Have Been Granted Because Counsel Was 
Ineffective in Failing to File a Motion to Suppress 
The state agrees that the validity of a Terry1 stop rests upon whether the officer had a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Respondent's Brief at p. 9. 
The state further apparently agrees by its lack of argument to the contrary that the failure to file a 
motion to suppress that would have resulted in suppression of the incriminating evidence in this 
case is ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052 (1984). 
Where the state and Mr. Padilla disagree is on the facts of this case and on the holding of 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000), and its application to this case. Further, 
although the state does not acknowledge the majority position on whether flight alone can justify 
a Terry stop, the state implicitly asks this Court to adopt a minority position - a minority position 
that is at odds not only with that adopted by a majority of courts in this country, but also at odds 
with Idaho's longstanding strong respect for individual privacy rights and the limitation of 
governmental power to usurp those rights. See, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,842 P.2d 660 
(1991), rejecting the United States Supreme Court's "good faith" exception to the exclusionary 
rule. 
As to the facts - Officer's Gonzales' observations and actions at the time of the Terry stop 
are set out three times in the record in this case - first in his affidavit in support of the complaint. 
State's Ex. I, D 27, Ex. Disc, pp. 71-72. There Officer Gonzales swears that "As I was driving I 
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). 
noticed a male walking southbound on Ketchum Street. When the male noticed my marked 
police vehicle he started running. I got out of my vehicle and yelled for the male to stop running. 
The male continued running ... " Id p. 72. 
Officer Gonzales' second report of the events is given in his preliminary hearing 
testimony: 
I was on routine patrol early morning on that Friday and I was traveling in the 
alley between 5th A venue and 6th A venue East in the 400 block and I - as I was in 
the alley, I had my lights off and I was just checking things out when I noticed a 
male walking southbound on Ketchum in front of me. I watched as this male then 
entered the roadway - or entered the alleyway in the 500 block just in front of me. 
As it got dark up the alley, I turned my lights on on my patrol vehicle and the male 
turned and looked at my vehicle. As I started to creep forward, the male exited 
the alley and started to run. 
I pulled my vehicle out onto Ketchum Street and I observed as the male continued 
to run in a southeasterly direction. I got out of my patrol car and I ordered him to 
stop running so I could see what was going on. 
State's Ex. 5, Ex. Disc pp. 94-97. 
Then at trial, Officer Gonzales testified: 
As I was - I was parked - well, I wasn't parked, but I was - I was moving slowly 
in the alley, with my - I was facing eastbound and I had my headlights off, as I 
was just creeping through the alley. And as I did, I noticed a male that was 
walking. As I was facing Ketchum Street, I was watching a male that had come 
into my view and he was traveling southbound on the east side sidewalk of 
Ketchum Street. I began to watch this male. 
The male individual, as he was walking southbound, he was actually on the north 
side of the alley, the male walked toward where the alley was, so now he was 
directly in front of where I was, only he was on the other side of Ketchum Street, 
and he entered the alley. And as he entered the alley, he walked a short ways 
down, did some shuffling, some fumbling around, while he was in the alley, came 
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out of the alley and began walking southbound again on the sidewalk. That's 
when I had exited the alley. I had turned my lights on, not my overhead lights on 
my patrol car, but my headlights, and I went to make contact with this individual. 
The individual turned at, turned and looked at me; and as I was getting out of my 
patrol car, he began to run. 
State's Ex. 15, Ex Disc. at pp. 203-204, Tr. Trans. p. 72, ln. 14 - p. 73, ln. 18. 
From this record, the state argues that Mr. Padilla was "lurking" in the alley to support its 
conclusion that a motion to suppress was not appropriate in this case. Respondent's Brief at page 
10. Yet, nowhere does Officer Gonzales state that Mr. Padilla was "lurking." Lurking, an 
intransitive verb, means: 
threat 
1. a: to lie in wait in a place of concealment especially for an evil purpose 
b: to move furtively or inconspicuously 
c: to persist in staying 
2. a: to be concealed but capable of being discovered; specifically to constitute a latent 
b: to lie hidden 
Merriam-Webster, www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/lurk. 
Rather, than describing Mr. Padilla as "lurking," Officer Gonzales describes him as 
"walking" in every single instance. Walking is a significantly different activity than lurking. 
While lurking might be a suspicious activity, depending upon the circumstances, walking is not. 
The state's argument that Mr. Padilla was "lurking" is contrary to the record and should be 
disregarded. 
The state also argues that Mr. Padilla fled "unprovoked" upon seeing Officer Gonzales' 
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patrol car. Respondent's Brief at page 10. (Although the state argues "Gonzales fled -
unprovoked" it is clear that it meant to argue that Mr. Padilla fled. Id.) However, again, this 
characterization of the facts is not supported by Officer Gonzales' sworn statements and 
testimony. Rather, Officer Gonzales' sworn statements and testimony are that he (Officer 
Gonzales) was the person who could better be described as "lurking" - sitting or "creeping" in an 
unlit vehicle in an alleyway. And, when he (Officer Gonzales) saw Mr. Padilla, according to 
Officer Gonzales, he suddenly turned on his headlights and began driving toward Mr. Padilla. 
Mr. Padilla described the event as follows: 
... And when I got in the alleyway, I heard a commotion across the street from 
me, and I didn't see anybody. I thought it was somebody, there's vehicles parked 
on the side of the road. As I got in the alleyway, a vehicle came out at me at a rate 
of speed that startled me. No lights were on or nothing, and -
No headlights, nothing. I ran between two houses, thinking I was going to get 
jumped because me and my brothers have gotten jumped before ... 
EH Tr. p. 38, In. 1-12. 
Insofar as the state rests its conclusion that a suppression motion would not have been 
granted in Mr. Padilla's case because he was "lurking" in the alleyway and engaged in 
"unprovoked" flight, the state is simply wrong. The facts as ascertained from Officer Gonzales' 
multiple statements regarding the events and Mr. Padilla's trial testimony are that Officer 
Gonzales was waiting or driving slowly in an alley, in the dark, in an unlit vehicle; Mr. Padilla 
was walking first on the sidewalk and then into the alley; no one else was around; Officer 
Gonzales turned on his lights while driving toward Mr. Padilla; Mr. Padilla ran from the car that 
was pursuing him. Mr. Padilla was not lurking and his flight was not unprovoked - it was a 
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reasonable response to being pursued by a vehicle that had previously been lurking unlit in an 
alley. 
Later in its brief, the state argues that Mr. Padilla's flight could not have been a 
reasonable response, because Officer Gonzales testified at trial that Mr. Padilla had looked at him 
prior to fleeing. Respondent's Brief p. 11, citing State's Ex. 15, Ex. Disc, p. 204. However, 
Officer Gonzales was unable, of course, to testify whether Mr. Padilla recognized that he was a 
police officer, and although his car was marked, the area was dark, the headlights apparently 
were pointed toward Mr. Padilla - which would have affected Mr. Padilla's ability to see the rest 
of the car - and Officer Gonzales had not activated his overhead lights - which would have 
provided information to Mr. Padilla that his pursuer was an officer. In other words, the evidence 
does not support the state's argument that Mr. Padilla's flight was unprovoked. 
The state also argues that Mr. Padilla's testimony describing his actions in tossing the 
contents of his pockets after he hurt his ankle and laid down in the bushes indicates that his flight 
was unprovoked and supported a claim of reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Mr. Padilla. 
Respondent's Brief at pages 11-12. However, Mr. Padilla actually testified that he did not toss 
the contents of his pockets until after the flight was over and he was laying in the bushes and 
heard many vehicles racing towards him. At that point, he realized he was being pursued by the 
police rather than some lone person attempting to jump him. EH Tr. p. 40, ln. 22 - p. 42, ln. 9. 
And, moreover, the action of tossing the pocket contents occurred well after the stop had been 
initiated, was not observed by any officer as it occurred, and cannot support the initial decision to 
effect the stop. 
The facts as actually established by Officer Gonzales' sworn statements and testimony are 
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at odds with the state's interpretations of the situation in its brief. The facts as they actually exist 
show that Officer Gonzales did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to support a Terry 
stop and thus the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Padilla's petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
As to the state's interpretation of the law, the state offers an incomplete reading of Illinois 
v. Wardlow to support its position that a suppression motion would have failed. A full reading of 
Wardlow shows that a suppression motion would have been successful. 
The state relies upon Wardlow, which it refers to as Wardlaw, to support its argument that 
a Terry stop was justifiable stating that the Wardlow court held that officers confronted with 
flight are authorized to stop the fugitive and investigate. Respondent's Brief at page 10. 
However, Wardlow is actually a narrower holding than the state acknowledges. In Wardlow, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the police were justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved 
in criminal activity and allowed to investigate further - under the particular circumstances of that 
case - specifically that Wardlow was in a high crime area known for heavy narcotics trafficking 
and he fled upon the seeing a police caravan approaching. The Court wrote: 
In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent's presence in an area of 
heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers' suspicion, but his 
unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. 
528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 676. 
The majority never stated that flight alone without more, for example presence in a high 
crime area, was sufficient to justify a stop. 
As discussed by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in a concurring and dissenting opinion, the 
State of Illinois had specifically asked the Supreme Court to announce a bright-line rule that 
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authorized the temporary detention of anyone who flees at the sight of a police officer. The 
respondent asked for the opposite bright-line rule - that flight could never alone justify a stop. 
And: 
The Court today wisely endorses neither per se rule. Instead, it rejects the 
proposition that flight is ... necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity, 
adhering to the view that the concept of reasonable suspicion ... is not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules, but must be determined by 
looking to the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture. 
Id, at 126-27, 120 S.Ct. at 677, internal quotation marks and citation omitted. 
Justices Gingsburg and Breyer would not have found reasonable suspicion to support a 
stop under the facts of Wardlow. Id. 
In this case, Officer Gonzales offered no testimony or sworn statements that Mr. Padilla 
was in a high crime area. The state offered nothing except flight to justify the stop. Wardlow 
requires more. If a motion to suppress had been filed, it would have been successful. 
Further, in asking the Court to affirm, the state is asking this Court, without citation to 
authority or argument, to reject the majority position discussed in Mr. Padilla's Opening Brief at 
pages 8-9, that flight alone generally is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. This Court should 
decline this implicit invitation. 
This Court most especially should decline this invitation because in Idaho the right to 
privacy and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is protected not only by the Fourth 
Amendment, but also by Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17, a broader constitutional protection. See State 
v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1988), holding that use of a pen register 
was a search under the Idaho Constitution and reaffirming that "we are free to extend protections 
under our constitution beyond those granted by the United States Supreme Court under the 
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federal constitution." See also, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), rejecting 
the federal good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462, 467, 
943 P.2d 52, 57 (1997), adopting a broader definition of curtilage under Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17, 
than applied under the Fourth Amendment, because, "We believe that this formulation of 
curtilage will better ensure that Idaho citizens' reasonable expectations of privacy will be met." 
In this situation, even if the state could make some sort of argument that the United States 
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment allows Terry stops based solely upon flight -
something of course that it cannot do for the reasons set forth above - Art. I, § 17 should be read 
to foreclose Terry stops based upon flight alone. And, as noted above, in this case flight was the 
only basis for the stop. 
This Court should reject the state's mistaken view of the facts presented in the district 
court; should reject the state's misreading of Wardlow; should reject the state's implicit argument 
that Idaho should adopt a minority position authorizing Terry stops based upon no more than 
flight; and further find that regardless of any federal analysis the stop was contrary to the Idaho 
constitution. Based upon those findings, the order dismissing the petition for post-conviction 
relief should be reversed. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Padilla asks that this Court 
reverse the district court and grant post-conviction relief. 
Respectfully submitted this Ji~ day of July, 2014. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Tarango P dilla 
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